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Introduction 
Covered with low dense vegetation, the Chaco region (Gran Chaco or Chaco Boreal) that 
separated Bolivia and Paraguay was a flat roadless wilderness inhabited almost exclusively 
by indigenous Indians. Since their formation as independent republics in the nineteenth 
century, neither Bolivia nor Paraguay was able to agree on a common border in the Chaco 
region. Land-locked Bolivia’s desire to push across the Chaco to reach the Paraguay river, 
from whence it could reach the sea, led to clashes with Paraguayan forces in the 1920s that 
escalated to full-scale war in 1932. With casualty rates equivalent to those of the powers that 
fought the First World War, the Chaco War, 1932-35, was South America’s bloodiest inter-
state conflict of the twentieth century. In a war in which both sides fielded armies totalling 
almost 400,000 men, Bolivia lost c.2 per cent of its population (56-65,000 dead) and 
Paraguay c.3.5 per cent (36,000 dead).2 It saw the mobilization of war economies, the use of 
French and German military advisory teams, large-scale battlefield engagements, the 
development of war-time alliances and the deployment of the sorts of modern weaponry that 
would become commonplace in the Second World War.3 It was a training ground – a South-
American Spanish Civil War – for the Second World War, although it is not clear what 
lessons, if any, the protagonists of the Second World War drew from the Chaco War. As 
Pierre Mondain aptly noted in Revue Historique, the Chaco War ‘possède toutes les 
caractéristiques d’une guerre moderne pour l’époque.’4 It was also a war in which Paraguay, 
by far the smaller, weaker power, emerged victorious in 1935, in control of the entire 
disputed Chaco region, and so was able to dictate the terms of the peace signed in Buenos 
Aires in 1938. 
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The English-language historiography on the war is minimal. Margarita Kallsen’s Referencias 
Bibliográficas de la Guerra del Chaco (1982), published in Asunción, lists some 450 books 
and articles on the war.5 Of this total, only fourteen are in English – some of which are 
dissertations or government publications – and only the two books by Bruce Farcau and 
David Zook are military as opposed to diplomatic histories of the war.6 A more recent 
Bolivian bibliography published in 1996 lists 187 books on the war, only one of which is in 
English.7 Of the approximately 350 books on the shelves of the Municipal Library in 
Asunción dealing with the Chaco War, none is in English.8 Some journal articles in English, 
French and Czech add to our understanding of the fighting of the Chaco war, but these 
articles compare poorly in both quantity and quality to the scholarship on other conflicts of 
the twentieth century.9 Nor is this gap filled by the more general texts on South American 
history. Harris Gaylord Warren’s Paraguay: An Informal History (1949) is atypical in that it 
devotes two chapters to the war; Leslie Bethell’s Cambridge History of Latin America 
(1991), in which the war gets but a passing mention, is far more typical and indicative of 
historical studies focussed on broader societal, economic and political change in the region. 
 
The extensive Spanish-language literature on the war is dominated by publishing houses 
based in La Paz and Asunción and ranges from battle narratives and personal memoirs from 
Bolivian and Paraguayan war veterans, to more general studies – sometimes from a Marxist 
neo-imperialistic perspective10 – on the military, economic, political and diplomatic 
dimensions to the war.11 With the exception of the memoirs of the Paraguayan field 
commander during the war, Colonel (later Marshal) José Felix Estigarribia, none of this 
corpus has been translated into English.12 The Spanish-language sources are not at the cutting 
edge of military-history study. Often written from a partisan perspective by serving or retired 
soldiers, many simply recount the military events of the war and ascribe victory to personal 
or national heroism. ‘But to this organized and arrogant power we intended to oppose the 
virile tradition of our people and the discipline of our courage’ was Estigarribia’s partial and 
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contestable assessment of why Paraguay won, and one which can be categorized as an ‘heroic 
interpretation’ of the Chaco War.13 It is difficult in the Spanish-language literature to discern 
any clear trends in terms of a conceptual, analytical or theoretical framework with a critical, 
objective core that unpacks the main military aspects of the war, precisely the sort of 
approach that is becoming commonplace for military studies of the other major wars of the 
contemporary period. David Zook’s The Conduct of the Chaco War (1960) was quickly 
translated into Spanish by an Argentinean publisher in 1962 (as La conducción de la Guerra 
del Chaco) precisely because his contribution was so unlike the South-American books 
written on the war. Indeed, the best Spanish-language works on the Chaco War such as 
Alfredo Seiferheld’s Economía y Petróleo durante la Guerra del Chaco (1983) take as their 
primary focus non-military aspects to the conflict, conceptualizing the war in the context of 
oil, economic change and global capitalism. The role played by the oil industry in promoting 
and sustaining the conflict with, it is argued, Standard Oil of New Jersey and Royal Dutch-
Shell clashing over the potential oil wealth of the Chaco, has prompted a distinct and 
distracting strand of analysis of the Chaco War.14 The idea that oil was the determining factor 
in the Chaco War even found its way into the 1935 ‘Tintin’ children’s adventure story 
L’Oreille Cassée – published in English as The Broken Ear – by Georges Remi, who wrote 
under the name of Hergé. In fact, there is little hard evidence available in company or 
government archives to support the theory that oil companies had anything to do with causing 
the war or helping one side or the other during the war. 
 
This article represents a critical ‘new history’ that aims to develop the scholarship on the 
Chaco War by presenting a military history of the conflict that will argue that a far superior 
logistical infrastructure built up before and during the war helped to determine Paraguay’s 
eventual victory. Effective logistical preparations allowed one land-locked state, Paraguay, to 
engage successfully a superior opponent, also land-locked, in a war with indifferent tactics 
and, by December 1933, achieve an operational success that led to victory in 1935 and the 
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realization of the grand strategy (or policy) objective of ending the Bolivian threat to the 
Chaco region. Logistics is defined here in broader terms than Baron Jomini’s ‘the practical 
art of moving armies’ or Martin van Creveld’s ‘the practical art of moving armies and 
keeping them supplied’ to include the preparation of the supply systems that are used once 
war starts.15 This more holistic definition is taken from the Oxford Companion to Military 
History (2001) and underpins the analysis in this article: ‘Logistics concerns not only the 
supply of matériel to an army in times of war, but also the ability of the national 
infrastructure and manufacturing base to equip, support, and supply the armed forces – the 
national transportation system to move forces – and its ability to resupply these forces once 
deployed.’16
 
Neither Bolivia nor Paraguay had a domestic arms industry before it went to war.17 The 
considerable quantities of matériel needed for the Chaco War – including tanks, warplanes, 
750-ton naval monitors (used on the river Paraguay), heavy and light artillery, anti-aircraft 
guns, flame-throwers, trucks, sophisticated optical ranging devices, clothing, saddles, rifles 
and automatic weaponry – all had to be sourced, ordered, paid for, imported from Europe and 
America, and then transported to the flat, desolate waste of the Chaco. The lack of matériel 
was the decisive factor that pushed back the start of the war to 1932. In the 1920s, especially 
in 1927-28, there were military clashes in the Chaco, but neither side felt able to escalate 
these border skirmishes until they had acquired the means to fight a full-scale war.18 From 
1921 to 1932, Bolivia and Paraguay busily prepared for war and the process whereby they 
acquired arms and equipment helped to determine the outcome of the Chaco War. 
 
This is not to say that logistics was the determining factor in Paraguay’s victory. During the 
war, Paraguay had a superior officer corps, better senior command and a far more favourable 
grand strategy position surrounded as it was by broadly sympathetic neighbouring states. By 
contrast, Bolivia had a chaotic internal political system, weak military command at all levels, 
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a poorly motivated army with low morale and was isolated internationally. The war was also 
fought close to Paraguay’s heartland, aiding its eventual success, and when Paraguay went on 
the offensive in 1934 Bolivia was then able to check its overstretched forces operating far 
from home. The argument here is that the logistical focus of this article forms a key element 
in the matrix of factors that helps to explain Paraguay’s successes in the Chaco War. 
Moreover, the broad discussion of logistics as suggested in this article dovetails with many of 
the other factors detailed above, thus adding to any complete examination of the more general 
planning, course and consequences of an oft-neglected twentieth-century war. 
 
Bolivia 
At first sight, Bolivia seemed well prepared for a war over the Chaco. It had three times 
Paraguay’s population, an army three times as big and a rich minerals base with which it 
could sustain itself and earn foreign currency to buy arms. By contrast, Paraguay was 
extremely poor, had a very weak economy and the British War Office was not alone in 
concluding that ‘unless the Argentine takes a hand, Bolivia should win’ in any war against a 
pre-war 2400-strong Paraguayan army equipped with outdated weapons and one that the 
British did not consider to be a ‘very serious fighting force.’19 Moreover, in 1926, Bolivia 
signed a huge arms deal with the British arms manufacturer Vickers-Armstrong that was to 
provide it with the means to fight a war for the Chaco.20 Farcau costs the arms deal at 
£3,000,000, later trimmed, due to a fall in the price of Bolivian tin, to £1,250,000 million; 
Zook prices the deal at £2,190,000, and lists the arms bought as fifteen warplanes, 65 
batteries of artillery, 50,000 rifles, 10,000 carbines, 300 machine guns, 760 automatic rifles 
and ‘an abundance of ammunition.’21 In Paraguay’s submission to the League of Nations in 
1934, it estimated the Vickers deal to be worth £3,000,000.22 None of these figures is exact. 
From May 1926, Captain F.J. Fairburn-Crawford of Vickers had been in La Paz negotiating 
with the Bolivian government for an arms deal.23 Worth £1,870,000, the two sides signed the 
final contract on 2 October 1926.24 The reduced figure of £1,870,000 – or $9,030,230 at a 
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1925 exchange rate of $4.829 to £1 – is still an impressive sum, and it provided Bolivia with 
everything it needed for a sustained conflict over the Chaco: 196 artillery pieces ranging from 
25mm. anti-aircraft guns to 105mm. heavy guns, 36,000 rifles, 6000 carbines, 750 machine 
guns, 12 warplanes, 2.5 million rounds, 10-20,000 shells for each of the different type of 
artillery pieces, 20,000 gas masks, helmets, bicycles, wireless equipment, lances, armoured 
motor-cycles, medical equipment, tents, water-bottles, bags, spades, wagons, plus much else. 
Vickers also promised to supply Bolivia with its own ‘Arsenal for War Material 
Manufacture’ that would produce 150,000 cartridges and 10,000 shells per week. Finally, a 
Bolivian team of five army officers, six army mechanics, three to four airforce officers and 
four airforce mechanics would go to Britain to train with the new weapons.25 Although 
Bolivia also negotiated with other companies such as Škoda26 of Czechoslovakia, the Vickers 
arms deal was the only major arms contract that Bolivia signed with a foreign arms company 
before or during the Chaco War. The Vickers deal emboldened Bolivia and without it war 
was unlikely, indeed probably impossible, as without the Vickers arms Bolivia did not have 
the matériel to fight anything other than brief border skirmishes in the Chaco. 
 
There were, however, four problems with the arms that Bolivia thought that it had acquired: 
firstly, Vickers for various reasons never sent the full £1,870,000-worth of equipment; 
secondly, the matériel that did arrive was often of dubious quality; thirdly, neighbouring 
states such as Argentina and Chile blocked the trans-shipment of Vickers consignments that 
had been shipped out for Bolivia; finally, the Bolivians were unable to transport the matériel 
that did arrive to the Chaco front because of a poor internal transport system. This poor 
logistical preparation helps to explain the defeat of the Bolivian army in the Chaco in 1932 
and 1933. 
 
In December 1927, the Bolivians pressed Vickers to expedite the delivery of the arms 
promised over a year earlier.27 In 1928, the Bolivians presented the British Legation in La 
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Paz with a long list detailing what Vickers had sent. Missing from the list was the Vickers 
artillery that would be so important in any war. Shells had arrived but no guns.28 By 1929, 
due to financial constraints, Bolivia found that it was having trouble paying Vickers and the 
Bolivian Minister of Finance went to America to try and float another loan with which to pay 
the company. Moreover, the Bolivians had insufficient ammunition with which to fight any 
large-scale conflict and the Bolivian pilots for the Vickers warplanes were still untrained.29 
With this in mind, in 1929, the Vickers arms deal was reduced to £1,200,000 with, as the 
British Foreign Office noted, a ‘considerable amount of these arms’ still undelivered.30 By 
1930, of the £1,200,000 that was to be shipped out to Bolivia, £458,000 was still 
outstanding.31 It is unclear from the archival sources just how much of the original 1926 arms 
contract was honoured, but from July 1932 to December 1934 Bolivia received from Vickers 
£425,158 worth of arms from contracts dated as early as 1927 that obviously had not been 
fulfilled.32 It is apparent that Bolivia received a fraction – probably about a quarter, maybe a 
third – of the original 1926 deal and that much of the reduced figure arrived too late to have 
any effect on the battlefield performance of the Bolivian army. Even British Foreign Office 
officials were not sure how much of the Vickers contract was realized, estimating in 1932 
that war material to the value of £695,885 had been sent to Bolivia, ‘but I am unable to say 
whether this is in fulfilment of the 1926 contract or of a later one.’33 As the correspondence 
in the Vickers archive shows, the Bolivians, with war approaching, complained repeatedly 
about the delays in shipment, especially concerning the all-important artillery pieces that had 
yet to arrive.34 In July 1931, a year before the outbreak of the war, Vickers guns were still 
being tested in Britain and were not ready for export.35 In September 1932, by which time 
Bolivia and Paraguay were engaged in full-scale hostilities, the British Legation in La Paz 
‘hoped that the rest of the Vickers’ equipment will be ready to leave England by the end of 
October.’36
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There were also concerns regarding the quality of the matériel sent by Vickers, especially the 
guns. Headed by Colonels Merino and Rivera, the Bolivian team in Britain struggled to sort 
out mechanical problems with Vickers ordnance.37 The complaints from the Bolivians about 
the quality of the artillery rumbled on into 1931 and 1932, forcing Vickers to send out to 
Bolivia a small team of mechanics led by Brigadier-General K.E. Haynes.38 The issue of poor 
quality workmanship was apparent to the British Legation in La Paz: 
 
In view of the complaints that had been received as to the unsuitability of the material 
supplied under this contract, Messrs. Vickers sent over towards the end of the year 
[1930] a small commission headed by General Haynes to endeavour to settle the 
differences which had arisen. It was admitted by Messrs. Vickers’ representative that 
certain of the material was not up to standard and perhaps not entirely suitable for use 
in this country, but generally the cause was the ignorance of the Bolivian army 
officers, and the lack of training in ordnance matters….39
 
The tiny Vickers team headed by Haynes was still testing and tinkering with non-functioning 
guns and small arms in the field after the war started in 1932. Indeed, in November 1932, a 
Major Briggs from Vickers – who was unable to speak Spanish and who was described by the 
British Legation in La Paz as being totally out of his depth in Bolivia – was dispatched to the 
Chaco front to try and help resolve the matter.40 The two sides were still negotiating the issue 
of broken equipment in May 1933, exactly the moment when Paraguay was fighting and 
winning the major defensive battles of 1932-33 against Bolivia.41 Vickers argued that the 
reason for the problems was not the quality of the matériel but shoddy maintenance by the 
Bolivian army: 
 
The whole bother with the Bolivians is their absolute want of knowledge of every 
technical detail of their equipment. Colonel Merino, who is here [in Britain], states 
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they have had certain trouble with the recuperators [in the artillery pieces]. Of course 
they have if they use soft soap and yellow grease in them; they are bound to have 
corrosion and all sorts of other trouble. Every nation that we sell these recuperators to, 
who have proper technical staffs, have given us nothing but praise.42
 
While training for Bolivian gunners was fairly basic – about a month’s training was provided 
in 1932 – there were also real problems with Vickers equipment.43 Regardless of who was at 
fault, in March 1933, the Bolivians sent back to Vickers in Britain 160 machine guns and 346 
Vickers Berthier rifles for ‘rectification’.44 The same inventory noted that only four out of 
eight 105mm. field howitzers had been delivered; of twelve 105mm. mountain howitzers only 
four had been delivered; of forty-eight 75 mm. mountain guns only twenty-four had been 
delivered; of thirty 65mm. infantry guns only six had been delivered.45 Moreover, instead of 
being on the high seas on their way to Bolivia, much of the undelivered artillery was still in 
Britain and it would take months before it was ready to be shipped out to Bolivia. Financial 
difficulties compounded Bolivia’s predicament as Vickers prevaricated on the repairs 
promised, worried that Bolivia was unable to pay.46 The results were disastrous for the 
Bolivian army fighting in the inhospitable and remote Chaco region with seriously flawed 
logistical support. Without a corps of mechanics, Bolivia was forced to fight a war reliant 
either on a reluctant Vickers’ workforce in Britain, or a handful of Vickers-appointed British 
military technicians working in the field trying to service a foreign army with alien traditions 
and methods.47
 
Even when the arms were paid for and shipped-out to Bolivia, neighbouring states often held 
up, tampered with or denied passage to the arms shipments. The Bolivians knew that they 
were reliant on the goodwill of their neighbours for the passage of the Vickers arms being 
shipped from Britain. The Bolivian government informed the British Legation in La Paz that 
it was ‘exercised in its mind as to by what route they could receive their arms from Vickers, 
 10
being surrounded by neighbours whose feelings were not of the best towards them, and 
through whose territory the arms would have to pass.’ The conclusion of the Under-Secretary 
was that Chile would refuse passage through its port of Arica, Peru would steal portions of 
any cargo going through its port of Mollendo, leaving only Argentina for trans-shipment.48 
The best route for the import of any arms was, indeed, via Argentina.49 In 1927, Vickers did 
not anticipate any difficulty using Argentina.50 But by 1928 an increasingly anxious Bolivia 
was pressing the British government to facilitate the passage of arms through Argentina, as 
was noted by the British Legation in La Paz: ‘Bolivian government are anxious to ensure safe 
transit of armaments through the Argentine and have intimated to me that they would be 
grateful if His Majesty’s Government could in any way smooth the path for these armaments 
of British manufacture. I replied that this was a very delicate matter but I would convey the 
message.’51 The Foreign Office reply, four days later, was to wait on developments, adding: 
‘Can it be because Bolivia is preparing to attack Paraguay?’52
 
By 1929, both Argentina and Chile were obstructing the passage of Vickers arms destined for 
Bolivia and the former had impounded some shipments, including some German arms 
destined for Bolivia.53 Bolivia persisted in trying to use the better import routes of Argentina 
and Chile but both states vacillated, making it impossible for Bolivia to know whether any 
given shipment would be allowed to pass or not. The Bolivians put pressure on Vickers who, 
in turn, put pressure on the British Foreign Office to persuade the Argentineans and Chileans. 
This policy had some success but was time-consuming and imperfect, especially as the 
Foreign Office was generally uninterested in helping Vickers, fearful of being accused of 
helping to sustain a foreign war and aware that Vickers’ main concern in pushing for the 
passage of arms was the fear that it might not get paid if the arms failed to arrive.54 By 1933, 
matters came to a head, with Chile closing off the port of Arica, and Argentina using the 
excuse of the formal declarations of war issued in 1933 to close its ports and borders to 
Bolivia.55 The closure of the border with Argentina was especially hard for Bolivia as it 
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relied on Argentina and the Argentinean railhead at Yacuiba not just as a route for Vickers 
imports but also for the passage of locally produced food and medical supplies that were 
needed for the Bolivian army in the southern Chaco (and the Bolivian population generally). 
Indeed, in the first few months of operations in 1932, the Bolivian army in the Chaco ‘would 
probably have starved’ without help from across the border in Argentina.56 As Farcau rightly 
concluded: ‘….the Bolivian army had always calculated its logistical requirements on the 
assumption that it would be able to obtain food from just across the Rio Pilcomayo in 
Argentina.’57 As for Chile, in February 1933, it was holding up £300,000-worth of Vickers 
consignments that had yet to be delivered.58 As the British Embassy in Santiago wrote in 
January 1933 concerning a Vickers shipment that had arrived in Chile: ‘This would, however, 
be the last consignment of munitions of war which would be allowed to proceed to Bolivia 
through Chilean territory. There was another consignment of 1,200 cases on its way. The 
Bolivian Minister would be informed today that it must be deflected to some other port and 
that all future consignments must be shipped through some territory other than Chilean.’59
 
In February 1933, the Bolivians were complaining that the closure of Arica meant that they 
were cut off from the outside world as Argentina was becoming impossible to deal with and 
Mollendo in Peru was unsuitable. Therefore, Bolivia was unable to take delivery of any more 
Vickers equipment.60 In fact, Mollendo remained open, as the Bolivians noted in April 1933, 
but, by late 1933, it was the only major entrepôt for Bolivia with the wider world.61 
Consequently, because of the difficulties with Argentina and Chile, Bolivia asked Vickers to 
send future shipments by way of Mollendo in Peru.62 This, however, was far from ideal as 
passage via Mollendo usually meant that ‘vital parts of armaments’ went missing while on 
transit through the port of Mollendo or on the Southern Railway of the Peruvian Corporation 
that snaked its way from Mollendo up to La Paz, the world’s highest capital city.63
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The one remaining window with the outside world for Bolivia was Brazil, a country willing 
to provide trans-shipment facilities before and during the Chaco War. In 1928, the Brazilian 
Ministry of War had permitted the transit of Vickers munitions of war from the Brazilian port 
of Santos to the Bolivian border town of Puerto Suárez in the northern Chaco.64 The route 
was, however, a dead-end in that any arms delivered to Puerto Suárez from Santos could go 
no further as the Bolivians had no railway or metalled road on their side of the border.65 
Moreover, Bolivia’s schwerpunkt in the Chaco War was in the south, in the area just north of 
the Pilcomayo river, and it was impossible to move the arms at Puerto Suárez from the minor 
war zone in the northern Chaco to the main zone of fighting in the south because of poor 
internal communications within Bolivia. In effect, the Bolivian war zones in the north and 
south of the Chaco were discrete, and only the less important one in the north could use 
Brazil’s railway to the port of Santos. Thus, only a fraction of the Vickers arms went to 
Puerto Suárez, and that which did go there was only of use for fighting in the northern Chaco. 
 
Neither were Bolivia’s roads and railways able to transport to the Chaco the matériel that did 
reach the country from abroad. To feed the main southern front in the Chaco, the Bolivians 
could use either the Argentinean railway line to Yacuiba or the Tarija/Villazón66 railhead in 
Bolivia; the railheads at Sucre or Arani supplied the northern front. Taking Fortín Boquerón 
as the main point of fighting in the southern Chaco in 1932-33, the Yacuiba railhead, closed 
by Argentina in 1933, was 250 miles in a straight line from the front. Once Yacuiba was 
closed, the Bolivians were left with the Villazón railhead, approximately 400 miles in a 
straight line from the front, while in the north the railheads at Sucre or Arani were some 500 
miles from the northern front.67 Unpaved, dirt roads went from the railheads to Puerto Suárez 
in the north and Fort Muñoz (and the 23rd parallel region) in the south, from whence lesser 
feeder roads connected with the shifting front lines.68 As the London Times concluded, the 
total distance from La Paz to the Chaco was 1000 miles, of which ‘only 500 miles are 
covered by rail. Over the remaining distance runs a narrow and broken road, at first over high 
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rocky plateaux, and then over wooded mountain slopes down to the flat plains of the Chaco 
jungle.’69 The assessment of the British Legation in La Paz was that the roads from the 
railhead at Villazón to Villa Montes and Fort Muñoz and beyond were ‘sandy and apparently 
of little use for cars or lorries….Lorries and cars apparently sink in the sand or else their 
engines are ground out with the dust. The road between Villa Montes and Fort Muñoz is said 
to be strewn with wrecked cars and lorries and there is supposed to be a fifty-kilometre 
stretch where motor cars cannot pass.’70 The Bolivians’ hasty sequestration of private cars 
and the establishment of a ‘chauffeurs’ corps’ did little to overcome the more fundamental 
issue of a lack of a repair service for the automobiles forced into service on unsuitable 
roads.71 In December 1932, a report from the La Paz Legation to the Foreign Office spoke of 
roads strewn with broken-down trucks and it was emphatic that ‘conditions of transport 
between Tarija and Villa Montes must be appalling; automobiles cannot be driven on account 
of the depth of the sand….between Villa Montes and Muñoz the road crosses the river twice 
and the lorries must be taken over pontoon bridges; with the advent of the rains72 and the 
floods these will be impossible, and communication with Muñoz can then only be by air.’73 
The consequence of the breakdown in transport was that in July 1932, at the start of the war, 
the Bolivians were forced to leave behind in La Paz Vickers and Schneider guns that they 
needed for the front, leaving their soldiers without the necessary fire support for intense 
battles against a determined, entrenched enemy.74
  
In 1928, the British Legation in La Paz estimated that Bolivian troops would have a two 
weeks’ march across their own territory to get to the Chaco and that Bolivia’s ‘inordinately 
long lines of communication’ gave Paraguay a distinct advantage in the Chaco.75 There was 
also the question of the drop in altitude from 12,000 feet at La Paz to 500 feet in the Chaco 
that increased the wear and tear on both men and transport facilities. By 1932, the estimate 
for the journey to the front had improved: one-and-a-half days by rail and two days by road to 
Villa Montes, and a further three days on foot to Fort Muñoz was the usual journey time.76 
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From Fort Muñoz, however, it was still, at least in 1932-3, some distance to the front line. 
With the exception of limited supply runs by aeroplanes, once the railheads had been passed, 
everything had to go by these unsuitable dirt roads as river transport via the Pilcomayo river 
was impossible as it was not navigable to anything but the smallest flat-bottomed craft. Not 
only a physical but also a psychological distance separated Bolivia from the Chaco. The 
average Bolivian had never been anywhere near the Chaco and had not the ‘slightest 
expectation of visiting it in the course of his life.’77 Moreover, the average Bolivian peasant 
conscript, acclimatized to conditions on the high lands of Bolivia, suffered badly in the harsh 
climate of the lowlands Chaco region. 
 
Bolivia’s internal transport infrastructure simply could not bear the weight of the Chaco War. 
The Bolivians knew that their communications compared unfavourably to those of the 
Paraguayans78 but, as with the arms imports, a curious optimism – perhaps fatalism is a better 
word – drove on their army. Outside military observers commented on the poor staff work of 
the Bolivians, the improvisation, extemporization and general lack of planning, but, above 
all, ‘It was an army with troops, but no service.’79 The consequence of the poor logistical 
preparation was that, from June 1932 to July 1933, Paraguay was able to check Bolivia’s 
initial assault at the battles of Boquerón, Toledo and Nanawa, before going on the offensive, 
in late 1933 and 1934, capturing Fort Muñoz, Picuiba and Cañada Strongest, and driving the 
Bolivians from all the Chaco by 1935. 
 
Paraguay 
The interest in Bolivia’s Vickers deal rather overshadows Paraguay’s attempts at buying 
arms. Paraguay began acquiring foreign arms – from the French firm Schneider – in 1921 and 
thereafter embarked on a clever multi-source arms buying strategy that would take it to 
victory in the Chaco War.80 Notwithstanding the abject poverty in which most Paraguayans 
lived, in 1922, Paraguay spent some $200,000 in gold on arms, worth approximately 
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£40,000.81 As Zook noted, the turning point for Paraguay came in 1925 when its President, 
Eligio Ayala, ‘launched a program of arms acquisition for Paraguay designed to equip a 
modern army of 24,000 with the latest equipment.’82 Zook’s estimate was that Paraguay paid 
$4,730,733 for arms from 1926 to 1932, a figure that represented some 60% of Paraguay’s 
national income, and one confirmed by Spanish-language secondary sources.83 The Bolivian 
estimate was that Paraguay in 1931-32 was spending 32% of its total income on its army.84  
The plan was to create a 24-30,000-strong army: four combat groups of 5820 men each with 
organic engineers, artillery, etc.85 According to Zook, Paraguay’s arms contracts in 1926-27 
in Europe ‘exceeded $2,000,000 and included rifles, pistols, sabres, ammunition, 24 
Schneider 75 mm. guns, shells, aircraft engines, 7 Wilbault pursuit planes, 7 Potez “25s”, 
saddles, blankets, uniform equipment, mule harnesses, tents, and the like.’86 Also included 
were two Italian-built gunboats, 7,000 Belgian Mausers, 200 Madsen automatic rifles, 
ammunition and 24 Stokes-Brandt mortars (the mortars costing $67,581).87
 
If Zook over-estimated Bolivia’s deal with Vickers, he under-estimated the scale of 
Paraguay’s arms buying. Marcial Samiengo used the Paraguayan Ministry of Defence archive 
in Asunción (the Departamento de Archivo del Ministerio de Defensa Nacional) for his book 
entitled Las FF. [Fuerzas] AA. [Armadas] de la Nación en el Decenio de la Pre-Guerra del 
Chaco hasta la Victoria de Boquerón (1979). In it, he shows that Paraguay was thinking of 
buying arms from 1923 but the key turning point was Executive Order 21.211 of 29 July 
1925 – dated 9 July by Jorge Antezana Villagrán88 – that authorized the expenditure of 
1,810,000 gold pesos, equivalent to £348,715, on arms acquisition in Europe.89 However, the 
actual sum expended on arms greatly exceeded this total. Samiengo records that by 1932 
Paraguay had spent $5,926,890 on arms – equivalent to a sum of between £1,227,354 and 
£1,244,677 – and, using the relevant government files, he details the purchases that make up 
this figure.90 This total of almost £1,250,000 compares favourably to the c.£400,000-worth of 
often poor-quality Vickers equipment that eventually found its way to Bolivia. 
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The Ministry of Defence archive in Asunción confirms the extent of Paraguay’s arms buying 
strategy both in terms of money spent and matériel purchased. The Paraguayans appointed 
General Manlio Schenoni to head up their arms-buying team that went to Europe in the late 
1920s. When Schenoni came home in 1929, to become Minister of Defence, his team, based 
in Belgium, remained in Europe, helped by the Argentinean General Manuel Costa of the 
‘Comisión Técnica Argentina de Adquisiciones en el Extranjero.’91 The range of European 
and American arms companies used by Paraguay is impressive. In 1926, the Paraguayans 
bought $300,756-worth of Mauser rifles and cartridges from Spain’s Fábrica Nacional de 
Oviedo and 176 Madsen machine guns from Denmark’s Dansk Rekylriffel Syndicat valued at 
£47,775 (worth some $230,000).92 After 1927 the arms buying increased exponentially and, 
from 1927 to 1932, the Paraguayans, led by Schenoni, negotiated for multiple orders of 
military equipment from America, Argentina, Belgium, Britain, Chile, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Holland, Italy, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland.93 Seiferheld lists thirty-three 
contracts from February 1927 to February 1929.94 This is probably an understatement. The 
range of orders placed and companies used was extensive, as the following indicative list 
shows: 
 
• In February 1927, the Paraguayans signed a contract with the Belgian Établissements 
Jules Fonson of Brussels for 400 cavalry sabres;95 
• In February-March 1927, the Paraguayans bought eleven million 7.65 mm. Mauser 
cartridges from Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de Guerre of Liège;96 
• In April 1927, the Paraguayans bought from the same Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de 
Guerre 304 Browning pistols and 25,000 cartridges;97 
• In August 1927, Schenoni bought military clothing from the Spanish as the 
Paraguayan army was changing its uniforms from khaki to green to match the terrain 
of the Chaco;98 
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• In 1927-28, the Paraguayans negotiated with the Dutch company, Nederlandsche 
Instrumenten Compagnie of Venlo, for range-finding equipment (Telémetros) for 
their artillery;99 
• On 26 March 1928, Schenoni was in Germany buying equipment, including clothing 
and saddles, a trip for which he spent $77,000;100 
• On 6 November 1928, the Paraguayans bought £15,759 of uniforms from Germany 
(equivalent to $77,000) with the Bank of England providing the finance and 
transferring the money;101 
• From 1927-29, the Paraguayans bought Colt weaponry from Colt Patent Firearm 
Company of USA (and shipped to Paraguay through Buenos Aires);102 
• On 7 January 1929, Schenoni was back in Denmark at the Dansk Rekylriffel Syndicat 
Copenhagen buying more Danish Madsen automatic weaponry;103 
• From 1930-31, the Paraguayans bought aerial photography equipment (that could be 
used for map-making) and binoculars from the French; also Schneider-supplied rifles 
and cartridges from France;104 
• On 17 January 1931, the Fabrique Nationale d’Armes de Guerre of Liège recorded 
that the Paraguayans had $134,634 (£27,880) yet to pay, with $177,414 (£36,739) 
already paid.105 
 
The Paraguayans drained their economy to raise the hard currency needed to pay for these 
arms, including, in 1929, an internal loan of £470,000 (100 million Paraguayan pesos), 70% 
of which was used to buy arms.106 The result was a thorough preparation for war that, while 
it caused some difficulties in terms of equipment standardization, overcame the potential 
problem of one arms company dispatching poor-quality equipment. The policy adopted by 
the Paraguayans allowed them to buy the best from each European country and meant that 
they could play one company off against another to get what they wanted at the best price. 
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Having wisely sourced their arms abroad, Paraguay had three additional advantages over the 
Bolivians: firstly, Paraguay’s neighbours, notably Argentina, trans-shipped matériel before 
and during the Chaco War; secondly, it established a workable internal transport network to 
take matériel to the Chaco front; finally, Paraguay made intelligent use of local Mennonite 
communities in the Chaco to help its war effort. 
 
Argentina was the key state for the import of arms to Paraguay. Its position vis-à-vis 
Paraguay was neatly summed up in a British Legation annual report from La Paz that 
compared the Chaco War to Europe in 1914 with Paraguay as Serbia, Bolivia as Austria-
Hungary and Argentina as Russia.107 Fearful of Bolivian expansionist claims in the region, 
and seeing Paraguay as a vassal state, Argentina provided Paraguay with consistent support 
before and during the Chaco War. Not only did imported arms enjoy free passage on 
Argentinean rivers and railways that connected with Paraguay, Argentina also supplied 
Paraguay with arms and munitions from its arsenals and helped with political and military 
advice.108 Argentina provided the arms free or on very favourable financial terms.109 It also 
gave Paraguay the use of various domestic facilities such as the Córdoba aircraft factory in 
Argentina that repaired the motors of Bolivian warplanes downed in the Chaco so that the 
Paraguayans could reuse them.110 Meanwhile, the Argentinean army deployed on the right 
bank of the Pilcomayo river, ostensibly for reasons of national security, but this served as a 
flank protection for the Paraguayan army and simultaneously exposed the Bolivian flank.111
 
The help afforded by Argentina was not lost on local diplomatic staff. In August 1932, the 
British Chargé d’Affaires in Asunción wrote to the Buenos Aires Embassy: 
 
More important, however, is the fact, which seems to be undoubted, that Paraguay has 
been drawing supplies of war material, including ammunition, from the Argentine 
arsenals, and I have even been assured that Paraguay has practically carte blanche to 
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draw thereon whatever she may require. There is no doubt that goods consigned to the 
Paraguayan Government have arrived both by rail and by river not appearing on any 
manifest, while other material arrives in even less orthodox fashion from unnamed 
places in Argentina, on the opposite bank of the River Pilcomayo. The concentration 
of Argentine troops on the southern bank of the Pilcomayo, which is also reported, is, 
of course, quite legitimate in order to maintain Argentine neutrality. It is expected, 
however, that this neutrality will be extremely benevolent as far as Paraguay is 
concerned.112
 
Not only did equipment pour into Paraguay from the south but Argentinean air force pilots 
were also said to have been allowed to ‘retire temporarily’ so that they could fly for 
Paraguay.113 The Argentineans even helped in the field of intelligence, with the Argentinean 
Legation in La Paz providing Paraguay with the keys to Bolivian general staff ciphers. This 
act is said to have been a determining factor in Paraguayan military successes in the Chaco in 
1934.114
 
While Chile was unable to provide Paraguay with the same level of direct support as 
Argentina, its long-standing dispute with Bolivia over its northern littoral around the town of 
Arica, which Bolivia had lost in the nineteenth century and wanted back, meant that its 
sympathies lay with Paraguay.115 Certainly, strategy dictated that Chile provide support for 
Paraguay against a potential enemy keen to gain access to the sea – be it through Paraguay or 
Chile. After all, if Bolivia gained an outlet to the sea in the Arica desert region, Chile would 
lose the profitable and politically influential control that it had over Bolivia. Finally, even 
Brazil and Uruguay seem to have helped Paraguay. 116
 
Matériel that arrived in Paraguay from Argentina came either via the Paraná and Paraguay 
rivers or by Argentinean railways to the southern Paraguayan town of Encarnación on the 
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Paraná river. The river route was capable of taking large ships as far as Asunción. The 
Central Railway of Paraguay (the Ferrocarril Central del Paraguay), completed in 1909, with 
a link with Argentina established in 1913 by a ferry-boat service across the Paraná river at 
Encarnación, took goods into Paraguay to the terminus at Asunción.117 Using either the 
railway or the river network, goods could be brought via Argentina quickly and safely to 
Asunción. From the Paraguayan capital, men and matériel for the Chaco front were then 
dispatched by ship up the Paraguay river. In 1926, Paraguay had been careful to order from 
Italy two 750-ton monitors, both of which arrived in 1931.118 These warships, the Cañonero 
Paraguay and Cañonero Humaitá, provided the next link in Paraguay’s logistical system, and 
were part of a naval expansion program that saw an increase in naval personnel from 650 in 
1925 to 10,000 in 1935.119 Supplemented by the Paraguayan merchant fleet, five cargo 
vessels and two passenger ships converted to hospital ships, the Paraguay and Humaitá 
ferried the Paraguayan army in speed and comfort to Puerto Casado, upriver from the 
Paraguayan capital, each ship capable of taking a full battalion of men. 
 
Unlike Bolivia, Paraguay had a railway network in the Chaco. In total, five private narrow-
gauge railways, with a combined length of 425 kms (266 miles), stretched out west into the 
Chaco from the banks of the Paraguay at the following river ports: Puerto Casado (160 kms 
or 100 miles), Puerto Pinasco (130 kms or 81 miles), Puerto Sastre (90 kms or 56 miles) and 
smaller lines at Puerto Guaraní and Puerto Palma Chica.120 These lines had been built to 
exploit the resources of the Chaco, in particular the Quebracho ‘axe breaker’ tree used for the 
production of tannin. Once the war started, the Paraguayan government rented the Chaco 
railways from the private logging companies. The railway at Puerto Casado, that stretched 
100 miles into the Chaco, was the main line used by the Paraguayan army. Troops from 
Asunción, ferried up river to Puerto Casado, would make the journey into the Chaco by rail. 
From the railhead, it was a short 70 kms (44 mile) march to Isla Poi, the central base for the 
Paraguayan army in the Chaco.121 This became a rapid means of moving around men and 
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equipment. For example, Estigarribia, the Paraguayan commander, was able to leave his 
GHQ at Villa Militar in the central Chaco and, travelling by rail to Puerto Casado and then 
ship up the Paraguay river, reach Bahía Negra in the far north of Paraguay early in the 
morning of the next day.122 Obviously, as a senior commander Estigarribia had priority on 
travel but the speed with which he moved from one war zone to another suggests that 
Paraguay had a flexible and efficient internal transport system. All of the key battles of 1932 
and 1933 were fought within a reasonable distance of the Puerto Casado railhead, giving the 
Paraguayans a logistical edge over their Bolivian opponents. 
 
The final factor working in Paraguay’s favour was the presence in the central Chaco of 
friendly settler colonies of Protestant (Anabaptist) Mennonites. There are now three 
Mennonite colonies in the Chaco, with the town of Filadelfia as their administrative centre. 
The first colony arrived from Canada in 1926 and established Colonia Menno at Loma Plata 
in April 1928; the second colony was established by Soviet/Russian settlers at Fernheim from 
1930 to 1932; the third colony at Neuland was established after the Chaco War in 1947.123 In 
July 1925, the Paraguayan parliament passed Law 514 that granted the Mennonites a 
Privilegium exempting them from military service and giving them local religious and civil 
autonomy. Following the passing of Law 514, there ‘came a most cordial invitation to the 
Mennonites to make Paraguay their home’ and Mennonites from Canada and the Soviet 
Union, whose way-of-life was under threat, subsequently moved to the Chaco.124 For the 
Paraguayans, the Mennonites represented a hard-working frontier settler community that 
would help them stake their claim to a wilderness area inhabited only by indigenous peoples. 
The irony was that the Paraguayans were using the pacifist Mennonites as their ‘weapon’ to 
secure the Chaco: ‘Mennonite ploughshares would function as “swords”.’125 The advantage 
for the Paraguayans extended beyond that of staking a claim to the Chaco: the heavy fighting 
in 1932-33 in the Chaco occurred just to the south of the Loma Plata and Fernheim colonies 
and the agriculturally minded Mennonites supplied the Paraguayan army with various fresh 
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foodstuffs, thus supplementing the cattle brought on the hoof for the army.126 While the 
Chaco War was a dangerous time for the Mennonites – munitions and body parts from the 
Chaco War are still being turned up by Mennonite farmers, some of which is deposited in the 
Museo Unger in Filadelfia – it was also a beneficial period as the Paraguayan army was a 
local market for their surplus food production.127 As with the arms-buying strategy initiated 
in 1925, the Paraguayans were pro-active and forward-thinking in settling the Chaco with 
Mennonites, providing for themselves a local source to help with logistics.128 The Bolivians 
tried to start a similar scheme with 400 German settler families before the First World War 
but before they could settle the Chaco the Great War broke out and the scheme collapsed.129
 
Conclusion 
While Paraguay’s victory in the Chaco War was a function of a combination of factors, as 
this article has attempted to show, better preparation and planning for war were key dynamics 
that facilitated the triumph of a financially and economically weak state over its larger 
Bolivian adversary with its German-trained and British-equipped army. When full-scale war 
started in 1932, Paraguay had the logistical train in place to fight a long war. Its shrewd 
policy of multi-sourced arms buying before the war provided the right mix of weaponry that 
equipped the men who went rapidly by river, rail and foot to the Chaco front. Although land-
locked, throughout the conflict, Paraguay kept open its international supply lines through 
Argentina, allowing it to nourish its army in the defensive battles of 1932-33 and then build 
up its forces for the grand offensive of 1934-35. Bolivia, meanwhile, had been poorly served 
by the Vickers company, whose arms never arrived in sufficient quantity or quality to allow 
its army to overcome the disadvantage of fighting at the end of ridiculously over-extended 
supply lines with few local allies willing to provide the transit facilities for the importing of 
the matériel needed for a long war. Victory and defeat in the Chaco War was the result of a 
combination of reasons but logistics was a key element in this, and the Bolivians’ misplaced 
hope that their German-trained army would be able quickly to overcome the smaller 
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Paraguayan reinforces the old maxim: amateurs talk tactics, professionals talk logistics. Or, 
as Field Marshal Erwin Rommel put it, ‘the battle is fought and decided by the quartermasters 
before the shooting begins.’130
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